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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) has historically conducted Unconventional 
Warfare (UW) in the remote, rural, under-developed regions of the world. This thesis 
analyzes the relevance of UW to contemporary joint urban operations (JUO) during 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations 
(SASO). America's pre-eminence on the conventional battlefield, and the asymmetric 
advantages cities offer, should compel adversaries to engage us on urban terrain. Despite 
this observation, current doctrine inadequately prepares our forces for MOOTW or SASO 
in cities. Modernization efforts focus predominantly on improving high-intensity combat 
skills, and developing technological combat-multipliers. During MOOTW and SASO 
casualties, collateral damage, and political consequences can rapidly erode public 
support; conventional combat operations may entail excessive political risk. Forces 
trained for unit maneuver warfare are not sufficient for stabilizing politically charged 
conflicts short of war. Unique capabilities, training, and experience conducting UW 
makes SF ideally suited for conducting JUO in this arena. A case study of U.S. 
involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates the unique capabilities SF provides 
commanders, not otherwise available in the extant force structure. This thesis advocates 
using UW to counter urban, asymmetric threats, and concludes with a recommendation 
for developing amplifying doctrine for conducting UW in urban areas. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
Resort to assaulting walled cities only when there is no other choice.1 
- Sun Tzu 
A.       WHY CITIES? 
1.        Overview 
To prepare to conduct urban operations it is important to understand why "there is 
no other choice," why military forces will be required to operate in such an environment. 
Demographic trends alone are not a sufficient explanation; asymmetric threats, and 
America's National Security Strategy explain why it is reasonable to assume increased 
involvement in Joint Urban Operations (JUO) will be unavoidable for American military 
forces in the future. 
Nations seldom enjoy the luxury of choosing where their armies fight. Were it so, 
they would strive to honor Sun Tzu's maxim, safeguarding their forces from slow, 
difficult, manpower intensive operations in cities. Unfortunately, urban areas have 
historically been lodestones for important military operations. Nations rely on the 
industrial, transportation, and communication hubs that cities provide. During Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) in 
cities, military forces are overwhelmed by the myriad responsibilities of urban 
infrastructure maintenance, the presence of noncombatants, and the potential for 
escalation to combat operations at any time, as evidenced in Mogadishu. Where combat 
operations occur, fighting is particularly brutal and costly.   Denied the maneuver and 
1
 Ames, Roger T. (trans.), Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare. New York: Ballantine Books, 1993, p. 111. 
1 
decisive battle western armies are organized for, engagements are reduced to the fierce 
small-unit actions epitomized at Stalingrad, Aachen, and Berlin. 
Demographics are often debated, and do not exclusively explain why JUO will 
become increasingly important.   Statistics fluctuate depending on where the geographic 
boundaries of cities are set, which changes population densities within cities, and what is 
or is not defined as an urban area.   Undeniably, the world's urban populations are 
growing.   From 1975 to 1995, the percentage of the world's population living in cities 
increased from 38 to 45 percent, with a projected 61 percent by 2025. Of the 369 cities 
worldwide with a population greater than 750,000, 189 are in the less or least developed 
nations of Africa and Asia.2   In each of these instances, the percentage of people living 
in absolute poverty in rural areas far exceeds the impoverishment of city-dwellers, 
magnifying the allure of urban migration.   By 2005, it is estimated that developing 
countries will account for 95 percent of the world's population growth.3   Even if these 
projections are not reached, population momentum in these nations will ensure high 
absolute increases for many years, exacerbating the extreme poverty extant in rural 
The United Nations identifies the following regions as less developed: Africa, Latin America, Asia 
(excluding Japan), Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. A sub-category identifies least-developed 
nations, including: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi 
Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia' 
Gambia, Guinea, Buina-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia' 
Madagascar, Malawi, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudani 
Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zaire, and Zambia. "The Urban 
Environment," World Resources 1996-97: A Guide to the Global Environment World Resources Institute 
1709 New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20006. Downloaded from http://www.wri org/wri/wr-96- 
97/96tocful.html, on 28 September 2000, p. 150-151. 
3
 World Urbanization Prospects:  The 1994 Revision Population Information Network Gopher of the 
United Nations Population Division, New York, 1995, p. 1. 
areas.4  As economic incentives in the rural sector are further eroded, urbanization will 
continue to increase. 
Eyeing global demographic trends provides only a partial picture. Regionally, 
Europe's population is expected to be 85 percent urbanized by 2025, while Africa may 
only attain 54 percent urbanization. Even the low African figures can be misleading; 
Libya's 93 percent urbanization projection contrasts starkly with Rwanda's 15 percent 
prediction. North and Central American urbanization is expected to rise to 79 percent by 
2025, and South America to a projected 88 percent. In contrast to the Americas, Asia is 
predicted to reach only 55 percent by 2025, ranging from Bhutan's 19 percent to 
Singapore's 100 percent, Kuwait's 99 percent, and Israel's 94 percent projections.5 Even 
within nations, urbanization densities vary widely. Consider the United States, where 
urban agglomeration of the Northeast greatly exceeds that in the Midwest. Within many 
nations, high levels of urbanization do not adequately illustrate a population divided 
between an enormous capital city and vast rural areas. 
It is unclear that these demographic trends alone favor a shift to JUO over 
operations in rural areas. As urban infrastructures become strained or overwhelmed, rural 
regions are also becoming increasingly impoverished. Furthermore, it is not clear that the 
4
 Demographers use the term population momentum to describe why population increase remains high 
even after fertility rates exhibit decline. The phenomenon is usually the result of the youthful age structure 
found in populations of developing nations. 
5
 "The Urban Environment," World Resources 1996-97: A Guide to the Global Environment. World 
Resources Institute, 1709 New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20006. Downloaded from 
http://www.wri.org/wri/wr-96-97/96tocful.html, on 28 September 2000, p. 150-151. 
burdens of over-urbanization result in political conflict.6   Two other factors, however, 
illustrate why JUO will become increasingly critical to America in the future. 
2.        Asymmetric Threats 
So 'ere's to you fuzzy-wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan; You're a pore 
benighted 'eathen, but a first class fightin' man.7 
- Rudyard Kipling 
Similar to Kipling's "fightin' man of the Soudan," many potential adversaries 
today are easily overlooked and underestimated. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
(MCWP) 3-53.3 cites the rebels of Grozny as a "small, relatively primitive" fighting 
force during the 1995 conflict.8 Even in hindsight, cultural differences and unfamiliar 
war fighting paradigms are often incorrectly viewed as weaknesses. In perspective, the 
nature of Chechen clan warfare provided a distinct advantage for the rebels, particularly 
on their home turf of Grozny. Their method of organization was certainly effective for 
them, and well adapted to the city they fought in. The Russians, facing an opponent 
using an entirely different operational approach, were slow to adapt to the Chechen 
methods. The Chechens used an asymmetric approach, tactically and strategically suited 
to their urban environment, to achieve success against a numerically superior Russian 
conventional force, even in this high-intensity conflict. 
6
 See Denoeux, Guilain, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal 
Networks in Egypt. Iran, and Lebanon. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993. 
Denoeux posits that informal social networks contribute greatly to political stability in the Middle East, 
where urban infrastructures have otherwise failed to provide necessary services for their citizens. 
7
 Kipling, Rudyard, "Fuzzy-Wuzzy." Downloaded from Rudyard Kipling - The Bard of British 
Imperialism, hnp://www.zeitcom.com/rmjgen/091dpling.html, on 28 September 2000. 
8
 U.S. Department of Defense, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, Military 
Operations on Urbanized Terrain fMOUD. Department of the Navy, April 1998, p. J-l. 
To a great extent, poor Russian preparation, and a culturally naive expectation 
that the Chechens would not fight, is to blame for the 1995 Russian defeat. By the 
January 2000 Grozny campaign, Russian leadership had learned valuable tactical lessons; 
using artillery and airpower instead of only tanks and infantry, fielding three times the 
manpower of their previous operations, and razing Grozny to the ground has denied the 
Chechen rebels the success they enjoyed in the 1995 conflict.9 It is unlikely that similar 
techniques would be politically palatable to American politicians in a MOOTW or SASO 
scenario. For this reason, an adversary like the Chechen rebels is highly problematic for 
U.S. commanders in an urban setting. 
America's national security strategy warns, "the U.S. must be prepared to fight 
and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric 
means...unconventional approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while 
exploiting our vulnerabilities."10 The U.S., and our potential adversaries, knows the great 
advantage of American strength lies in our supreme excellence on the high-intensity, 
maneuver battlefield, as recently demonstrated in the Gulf War. Urban terrain denies 
America this advantage; therefore, our enemies should try to compel us to fight in cities. 
During the 1998 Army After Next (AAN) Spring Wargame, disturbing evidence 
arose that U.S. forces are still not prepared to meet this challenge. The Wargame was set 
in the year 2021, with Red enemy forces attacking states on the south shore of the Persian 
Gulf.   The United States, already engaged in peacekeeping in Indonesia, and facing 
9
 Thomas, LTC Timothy L., USA, "Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned." Military 
Review. July-August 2000. Downloaded from http://www- 
cgsc.army.miiymikev/English/JulAugOO/thomas.htm, on 28 September 2000. 
10
 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, Washington, D.C., December 
1999, p. 19. 
5 
escalating border conflict between Pakistan and India, faced a tough test of its new, 
rapidly deployable Battle Force. Not surprisingly, our opponents sought to quickly 
nullify the Battle Forces maneuver and firepower advantages by "going to ground" in 
cities. A subsequent RAND report concluded: 
The decision by Red to enter and hold poorly defended [by friendly 
forces] urban areas became a key aspect of the game. As a result, the most 
modernized U.S. units, which were specifically designed to exploit the 
effects of long-range precision fires through operational maneuver, had 
little utility, and the urban areas had to be cleared by coalition forces, U.S. 
Marine Corps units, and Army XXI units. This enemy move proved to be 
an effective asymmetric counter to significant U.S. technological 
superiority.11 
The Red commander regarded his network of occupied cities as the main means 
for defending the homeland against American or allied ground attack. A corollary to this 
recognition was the unfortunate conclusion that, "AAN Battle Forces were clearly 
unsuited for urban operations."12 It is this asymmetric threat that ensures our future 
involvement in what is the ultimate enemy sanctuary. 
3.        National Security Strategy 
America is not likely to revert to isolationism, or to idly sit-out conflicts around 
the globe that fall short of war. While the primary mission of American armed forces 
remains "to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests 
are threatened," our military will also be employed to support MOOTW and SASO due 
to its "unique capabilities and resources."   One of the core objectives of our National 
1
' Perry, Walter L., Pirnie, Bruce R., and Gordon, John V., IV, Issues Raised During the Army After 
Next Spring Wargame. RAND, MR-1023-A, Santa Monica, 1999, p. 10. 
12
 Ibid., p. xi. 
Security Strategy is "to promote democracy and human rights abroad." 13  This strategy 
envisions a leadership role abroad for the United States. 
To implement our security strategy, the U.S. has identified "effective global 
power projection" as an essential capability for "responding to potential crises and 
conflicts, even when we have no permanent presence or a limited infrastructure in the 
region."14 Given recent reductions in the size of America's military forces, and overseas 
presence, U.S. power projection capabilities are increasingly important. Although these 
capabilities are expanding dramatically, America's current power projection strategy is 
dependent on the use of specialized theater arrival facilities: seaports, airports, and 
railway or road networks typically available only in large urban areas.15 During a force 
projection operation, up to ninety percent of the total tonnage — fuel, ammunition, and 
supplies — will travel by sealift The majority of all personnel necessary will fly into 
theater on commercial passenger airlines. 16 The requirement for secure ports and 
airfields increases the need for unopposed force projection capability. The denial of these 
necessary facilities to U.S. forces will dramatically curtail our ability to implement our 
National Security Strategy. As power projection gains importance, involvement in JUO 
will increase. Recent operational evidence validates this observation: 237 of the last 250 
U.S. Marine Corps overseas deployments involved urban operations.17 
13
 Ibid., pp. 11,20, iii. 
14
 Ibid., p. 11. 
15
 Frank R. Boynton, Power Projection Operations and Urban Combat: An Avoidable Combination?, 
(Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995) p. 1. 
16
 Ibid., p. 2. 
17
 Russell W. Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Skies:  The American Military and the Impending 
Urban Operations Threat. RAND, MR-1007-A, Santa Monica, 1998, p. 3. 
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B.        PURPOSE 
This thesis analyzes the relevance of the UW mission to contemporary JUO 
during MOOTW and SASO. The modernization and transformation efforts of policy- 
makers and senior decision-makers in the U.S. military focus on improving high-intensity 
combat skills, and developing technological combat-multipliers ~ an approach that 
ignores important realities of JUO during peacetime or conflict, where MOOTW and 
SASO predominate. During MOOTW and SASO, casualties, collateral damage, and 
political consequences can rapidly erode public support; conventional combat operations 
may entail excessive political risk. Traditional war fighting missions alone are not 
sufficient for stabilizing politically charged conflicts short of war. Operations during 
peacetime and conflict, particularly where less than vital national interests are at stake, 
may make it difficult to justify the level of destruction and bloodshed often associated 
with urban combat. 
This analysis addresses the question: what is the role of today's unconventional 
warrior in the contemporary urban arena? The answer illustrates to today's Joint Force 
Commanders (JFC) the effectiveness of using politically and culturally attuned 
unconventional forces, trained and experienced in irregular warfare methods, to counter 
urban threats. We must not limit commanders to operational methods designed for high- 
intensity, maneuver warfare. Providing commanders with another option - 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) ~ to counter asymmetric threats will ensure deployed 
forces have the requisite capabilities for operating in the unique urban environment. 
Without such capabilities, doctrinal, training, and technological improvements may be 
wasted. 
8 
C.   METHODOLOGY 
It is intriguing to suggest that small numbers of specially trained personnel, 
normally associated with UW in the remote jungles of Laos and Vietnam, can fill an 
operational void in today's most technologically advanced, joint, multinational urban task 
forces. But America's unconventional forces trace their origins to the Jedburg teams of 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, originally trained, organized, 
and employed to conduct partisan support and UW in populated German-occupied 
Europe. To focus my study, I have limited my analysis to JUO during MOOTW and 
SASO, which occur during peacetime and conflict.18 Wartime missions are doctrinally 
well defined, but contemporary JUO increasingly occur during peacetime and conflict, 
operational environments far more ambiguous, challenging, and less rigorously 
examined. 
Given that it is reasonable to assume American forces will increasingly operate in 
cities in the future, I examined the nature of contemporary JUO. Chapter II details 
characteristics of the contemporary urban operational environment, as outlined by Joint 
Publication (JP) 3-06 Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations (First Draft). This chapter also 
identifies elements of urban operations that are becoming more significant than in the 
past: the presence of noncombatants, the presence of media, civil affairs (CA), and 
information operations (10). 
J
° According to JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, war, conflict, and peacetime define the three 
environments in which the range of military operations may be conducted. FM 100-20 Stability and 
Support Operations defines conflict as, "a range of political conditions that are neither peace nor war. 
Conflict is characterized by the introduction of organized violence into the political process; yet groups in 
conflict remain willing to resolve their problems primarily by political means, with limited military 
support. The lower range of conflict is peaceful, punctuated by occasional acts of political violence. At the 
upper levels, conflict is very close to war, except for its combination of political and military means." 
In light of these characteristics, I evaluate the suitability of Unconventional 
Warfare for this environment in Chapter m. A literature review of U.S. doctrine reveals 
that conventional forces are not oriented on JUO during MOOTW or SASO. Even DoD 
doctrine developed for MOOTW and SASO gives scant attention to the unique 
characteristics of cities. Doctrine for our unconventional forces, however, indicates these 
forces may possess attributes and capabilities far better suited to this unique environment. 
Specifically, Unconventional Warfare conducted by SF may be uniquely suited to address 
the important, overlooked elements of JUO during peacetime and conflict. 
Chapter IV relates the experiences of SF during JUO in Bosnia. The objective of 
this case study is not to provide an exhaustive historical narrative, but to highlight the 
UW capabilities SF provided to commanders. These capabilities fulfilled an unforeseen 
requirement, or were capabilities not available to commanders in their extant force 
structure. I selected this example for three reasons: 1) the military operation occurred 
within the past decade and is ongoing, thus is representative of contemporary U.S. 
military operations; 2) a significant amount of the operational activity for this mission 
was conducted in urban areas; 3) the case illustrates the complex multinational, joint 
nature of such missions, a significantly tougher test than observation of unilateral 
operations. 
Although it can be argued I have limited the general validity of my observations 
by presenting only one case, and one that is ethnically and culturally unique to the 
Balkans, my focus is not on specific cultural characteristics, geographic peculiarities, or 
regional populations. This analysis addresses characteristics common to all built-up 
areas,  and the  operational  strengths UW provides commanders  to  address these 
10 
characteristics. Further research might well illustrate the applicability of these findings to 
all geographic areas, throughout the full spectrum of military operations. 
Ultimately, this study concludes that UW is uniquely suited to address the 
requirements of the contemporary urban arena - requirements currently unfulfilled by 
other forces. Furthermore, it concludes that current UW doctrine is inadequate to best 
exploit the unique capabilities unconventional warriors can bring to modern JUO. 
Developing amplifying doctrine for urban UW would best utilize extant capabilities. 
11 
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II.  THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN OPERATIONS 
In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing 
displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next 
moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart - conducting 
peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal 
mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It 
will be what we call the three block war.19 
- General Charles Krulak, 31st Commandant, USMC 
A. OVERVIEW 
Joint Urban Operations (JUO) during Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) bear little resemblance to the 
pitched street fighting of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Small unit combat 
effectiveness remains essential, because even JUO during peacetime and conflict can be 
punctuated by lethal, high-intensity combat actions. Measures of effectiveness (MOE), 
however, do not typically revolve around enemy forces killed or destroyed. The large- 
scale employment of military forces into a permissive or uncertain environment often 
risks further escalation to an unacceptable level, and can reduce the diplomatic flexibility 
of the United States and its allies once forces have been committed. 
This chapter details characteristics of the urban operational landscape as identified 
by Joint Publication (JP) 3-06 (Draft) Joint Urban Operations, identifies factors gaining 
increased prominence in recent JUO, and highlights the significance of these 
characteristics to MOOTW and SASO. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
To them the jungle seemed predominately hostile, being full of man-eating 
tigers,  deadly fevers,   venomous snakes and scorpions,  natives  with 
^ Krulak, Charles C, "The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas," presented at National Press 
Club, Washinton, D.C., 10 October 1997, Vital Speeches of the Day. 15 December 1997, p. 139. 
13 
poisonous darts, and a host of half-imagined nameless terrors. They were 
unable to adapt themselves to a new way of life and a diet of rice and 
vegetables. In this green hell they expected to be dead within a few weeks 
- and as a rule they were...The truth is that the jungle is neutral. It 
provides any amount of fresh water, and unlimited cover for friend as well 
as foe - an armed neutrality, if you like, but neutrality nevertheless. It is 
the attitude of mind that determines whether you go under or survive. 
There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. The jungle 
itself is neutral.20 
- F. Spencer Chapman 
Strangely, the city shares many characteristics with the jungle environment. 
Upton Sinclair's The Urban Jungle alluded to this commonality at the turn of the century, 
but the symbolism has military implications, as well.   Both terrain types share greatly 
reduced observation and detection distance, making engagements sudden and at short- 
range.   Maneuverability is significantly degraded in both, limiting the capabilities of 
armor and mechanized forces, and reducing the size of effective maneuver elements. 
Logistic demands also share some similarity, including difficulty of casualty evacuation, 
and limited resupply routes and methods. The metaphor need not be carried too far; more 
important is the observation that the 'jungle is neutral.'  The difficulties and advantages 
posed by the urban environment apply equally to friend and foe, if both are astute and 
flexible enough to exploit them.    The "nameless terrors" of the urban jungle are 
operational hurdles for all.   If our enemies have better learned to surmount the city's 
challenges, and exploit the unique nature of this environment, we had best rapidly adapt 
to a "diet of rice and vegetables," that we may meet our opponents on equal footing. 
20
 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Unconventional 
Warfare: Summary Sheet Packet. Special Forces Officer Qualification Course Material, November 1991 v 
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U.S. doctrine for JUO is sorely inadequate and badly dated; it rarely addresses 
urban areas in the context of MOOTW or SASO.21 Fortunately, proposed doctrine 
provides a framework for discussing characteristics of this operational environment. JP 
3-06 (Draft) defines joint urban operations as, "all joint operations planned and 
conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objectives on a 
topographical complex and its adjacent terrain where manmade construction and the 
density of noncombatants are the dominant features."22 Doctrine approaches the city as 
an environment, not a mission. JUO are the set of missions undertaken in this 
environment, and they have distinct characteristics when executed in cities because of the 
unique nature of the environment. The character of this environment has gained attention 
and generated debate. Indeed, the degree of difficulty these characteristics impose on the 
conduct of military operations is the reason for Sun-Tzu's age-old dictum, "Resort to 
assaulting walled cities only when there is no other choice." Condensed from JP 3-06 
(Draft) Joint Urban Operations, these characteristics of the operational environment 
include: reduced technological advantages; increased demands for manpower; 
decentralization; increased demands for time; unique constraints; alteration by terrain of 
weapons and munitions effects; unique and demanding logistics requirements; and unique 
advantages for defenders, insurgents, and terrorists.23 
This list is not meant to be all-inclusive, but provides a doctrinal framework for 
assessing this environment.     Observations drawn from Marine Corps Warfighting 
21
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22
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23
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Publication (MCWP) 3-53.3 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, and Field Manual 
(FM) 90-10-1 An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas, reinforce some of 
the eight operational characteristics listed. 
1.        Reduced Technological Advantages 
America's military is accustomed to technological superiority. Urban terrain 
blunts this edge, and compels U.S. forces to develop new technologies, or find low- 
technology alternatives to accomplish the mission. Residential and industrial power 
lines, electric trains and trolleys, phone lines, and the existence of man-made structures in 
urban terrain interfere with the normal way our forces operate. Our reliance on UHF and 
VHF communications, electronic sensors, long-range precision optics, and aviation assets 
ensures that blunting this technological edge will have far-reaching impacts on our 
capabilities and operational methods. 
Perhaps the single most important capability that will be hampered is the 
intelligence collection effort. In many instances, as technology improves, human sources 
of intelligence (HUMINT) have been replaced with sensors and other technological 
means (IMTNT, SIGINT, COMINT, and MASINT). These tradeoffs are not without 
costs, however. Some analysts feel America's over-reliance on technological collection 
methods has resulted in a critical shortcoming not easily remedied. In The Art of 
Darkness, author Scott Gerwehr notes that, "sensors and communications operate less 
reliably and at reduced power in urban terrain...HUMINT sources may in fact be 
multiplied greatly in the urban environment."24 Without the ability to capitalize on this 
resource, U.S. urban collection efforts are significantly handicapped.  One conclusion of 
24
 Gerwehr, Scott and Glenn, Russell W., The Art of Darkness:   Deception and Urban Operations. 
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an Aberdeen Proving Ground historical study (commonly known as the McLaurin Study), 
is reflected in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3: 
Intelligence is imperative to success in urban warfare...Few tactical 
changes can overcome the far-reaching impact of a major intelligence 
error...of the battles studied, battles lost were attributed to errors in initial 
intelligence.25 
An Associated Press release on February 28, 2000, described the government's 
General Accounting Office (GAO) as being equally critical of urban intelligence 
methods. Reporter David Ho cited GAO investigators as stating; "U.S. forces currently 
do not have adequate information...due to the lower priority the intelligence community 
has afforded urban warfare in its collection efforts."26 The GAO noted that poor 
intelligence about local conditions in recent conflicts such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and 
Rwanda could lead to greater risks for U.S. forces and civilians. 
Reduced intelligence is not the only result of degraded technology in JUO. 
During MOOTW and SASO, degraded capabilities can combine to produce tenuous 
operational situations. Insufficient intelligence prohibits the Joint Force Commander 
(JFC) from anticipating threats; debilitated communications reduce the commander's 
ability   to   synchronize   coalition   and   multinational   efforts;   without   responsive 
RAND, MR-1132-A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 48 
25
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Communications, force protection is also jeopardized, and isolated forces may react 
inappropriately to perceived threats in the absence of guidance. The resultant lack of 
command and control (C2) can cause minor crises to quickly escalate, jeopardizing 
operational and strategic objectives. 
2.        Increased Demands for Manpower 
The extent of three-dimensional battlespace in cities is greater than in other terrain 
types. Urban forces must consider not only the surface battle, but also the operational 
impact of supersurface and subsurface environments, airspace, and the external and 
internal space of structures. During combat operations, time-consuming, infantry- 
intensive engagements at extremely close range become the norm. While close combat is 
generally the least favored technique of prosecuting ground operations, tactical urban 
battles have proven particularly lethal, historically generating fifty percent casualty 
rates.27 Although combined arms operations are still most effective, they are much more 
difficult to execute. 
During MOOTW and SASO, civil-military concerns have the potential for 
diverting significant manpower from operational missions. In addition, political realities 
suggest that such JUO will include coalition or multinational forces, greatly increasing 
the number of units and personnel in the operational area. The dispersed, mobile nature 
of non-traditional threats to friendly military forces pose added manpower demands for 
force protection. Despite these realities, the large-scale employment of military force can 
heighten existing tensions in an uncertain environment, actually exacerbating efforts to 
27
 LTC John Holcomb, presentation during RAND conference: "Capital Preservation: Preparing for 
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restore or maintain order and stability. The JFC must balance the vast requirements for 
manpower with the need to avoid escalation. 
3.        Decentralization 
In JUO, the ability of U.S. forces to identify, influence, manipulate, or target 
threat forces in urban environments is hindered by our opponents' dispersed and 
decentralized nature. Lecturing on insurgency and sub-state conflict, Professor Gordon 
McCormick calls this the "see-hit dichotomy."28 Irregular forces depend on their stealth 
and invisibility for survival, while American forces are often overly reliant on 
technological means of detection. We must see (identify/understand) our target to hit 
(influence/destroy) it. In an urban setting the terrain negates our technological edge, and 
masks the dispersed actions of our adversaries. 
Maneuver restrictions dramatically decentralize ground operations. Labyrinths of 
narrow, unfamiliar streets hinder navigation, decentralizing command and control of units 
forced to disperse. In Mogadishu, the inability of dispersed relief columns to aid the 
beleaguered Task Force Ranger jeopardized mission success. The delays and confusion 
caused by dispersed and decentralized elements also subjected friendly forces to repeated 
ambush along the alleys and passageways of the city. Eighteenth Century military 
theorist Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq recognized the debilitating effects of dispersion 
and increasing technological sophistication on the morale and cohesion of units.29 
Modem-day theorists have also posited that the more expanded and decentralized the 
28
 McCormick, Gordon.    SO3802 (Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare) class lecture at the Naval 
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battlefield becomes, the greater the risk cohesion will disintegrate.30 In the urban 
landscape, where irregular threats add to the stress of an already decentralized operational 
environment, effectiveness is at risk. 
During JUO, the linkage of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives means 
national policy goals can be achieved or thwarted even at the tactical level.31 The nature 
of street fighting entails the decentralization of already small tactical units. The 
dispersion of these small maneuver elements further frustrates effective C2. The fog of 
urban battle, combined with rapid operational tempo (OPTEMPO), often overtakes the 
ability of senior leaders to control and direct unfolding events. Clausewitz describes this 
phenomenon: "effort is increasingly dispersed; friction everywhere increases and greater 
scope is left for chance...dragging the commander down, frustrating him more and 
more."32 Junior leaders and individuals quickly find themselves making decisions 
formerly left to battalion-level or brigade-level leadership. This observation is not new. 
In the battle for Stalingrad, Soviet Marshal Vasili I. Chuikov recognized the power of 
small, ably led, independent units. He wrote of his 64th Army: 
In our counter-attacks we abandoned attacks by entire units and even 
sections of units. Towards the end of September storm groups appeared in 
all regiments; these were small but strong groups, as wily as a snake and 
30
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irrepressible in action.33 
This characteristic of street lighting underscores the need for well-trained, 
experienced leadership at the lowest levels of tactical maneuver, even during operations 
short of war. During MOOTW and SASO, it is similarly critical that isolated junior 
leaders do not allow minor crises to escalate, jeopardizing national or coalition efforts. 
Further adding to the challenge of decentralized leadership is the multinational 
nature of JUO. Units requiring medical assistance, logistical support, or help in a crisis, 
must contend with interoperability issues as a major concern. Once only a problem for 
Army-level leadership, today small-unit leaders are frustrated at their attempts to 
communicate with multinational and joint partners. The inability to communicate 
isolates many smaller units from the larger tactical and operational picture, multiplying 
the strain of leadership. In Mogadishu, for the few weeks U.S. Navy ships were offshore, 
the Army hospital in the city was unable to communicate with them. While the Army 
and Marines used the same tactical radio system, problems arose because of differing 
service-specific modernization and upgrade cycles.34 In 1999, preparedness assessments 
carried out by the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J7) pointed out that 
"Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) architectures were not fully 
integrated, but were overburdened and vulnerable to kinetic or computer attack. 
Moreover, systems were seldom fully interoperable with coalition partners, and at times 
were incapable of being linked to national or CINC support systems."35 
33
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4.        Increased Demands for Time 
America's military is primarily designed to destroy the military might of its 
enemies. Although power projection to remote locales can be a slight delay to 
accomplishing this goal, the fundamental orientation of our forces remains the same. To 
accomplish this goal, our leaders have been trained to identify the military centers of 
gravity of their adversaries, and to focus their efforts at a decisive point to quickly 
conclude operations on successful terms. This war-fighting paradigm can be problematic 
during MOOTW or SASO, where non-traditional roles are often required of our military 
forces. Many of these non-traditional roles, such as maintaining stability to facilitate 
diplomatic efforts, do not offer the promise of quick, decisive engagement, and this can 
be very frustrating for commanders. Likewise, the daunting task of planning and 
preparing for JUO can be more complex and time-consuming than operations in other 
areas. As demonstrated by contemporary JUO in Bosnia and Kosovo, time is necessary 
for consensus building among nations, and the formation of multinational coalitions. 
JUO conducted amidst ongoing political tension and ethnic friction can escalate 
without warning. Should political violence necessitate combat operations, the sheer 
volume and complexity of the urban battlespace is intimidating for even the largest 
forces. For these reasons, JUO during MOOTW and SASO demand time, and often deny 
policy-makers a clear exit strategy, or the swift conclusion of the maneuver battlefield. 
5.        Unique Constraints 
The presence of noncombatants is a defining characteristic of JUO, and constrains 
the application of military force. America's apparent sensitivity to noncombatant 
casualties, and desire to limit collateral damage, has prompted restrictive Rules of 
22 
Engagement (ROE) that our forces are not habitually trained to operate under. U.S. 
forces can quickly find themselves on a level playing field with their less capable or less 
sophisticated opponents, who harbor no reservations about the indiscriminate use of force 
at their disposal. American military planners are likewise not habituated to the presence 
of noncombatants in the operational area. This reality during many JUO can hinder C2 
by complicating planning efforts, or diverting resources from their primary mission to 
care for unexpected civilian presence. Prior to Operation Just Cause in Panama, planners 
coordinated Operation Klondike Key to secure and evacuate tens of thousands of 
American citizens from Panama City. While securing the Torrijos International Airport 
in Panama, Rangers unexpectedly encountered 376 civilian airline passengers. The 
resulting hostage crisis precipitated by PDF gunmen significantly slowed the 
accomplishment of the Rangers' mission.36 
The presence of refugees and noncombatants often result in ROE that restrict the 
application of firepower, taking commanders beyond the normal parameters of their 
traditional war-fighting paradigm. A recent RAND study analyzed several recent urban 
conflicts and concluded: 
For the MOUT [Military Operations On Urban Terrain] commander, an 
ROE tradeoff always existed: either restrict the use of airpower, artillery, 
and armor and accept higher infantry casualties as a result, or allow 
heavier weapons to inflict collateral damage and noncombatant 
casualties.37 
During the initial fighting in Grozny in 1994, Russian forces obeyed orders not to kill 
civilians.   Russian forces, burdened with restrictive and confusing ROE, without non- 
36
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lethal means of force, and with little training for such situations, were impotent before 
Chechen civilian crowds that set fire to vehicular columns and blocked re-supply 
convoys.   Ultimately, these noncombatants were able to halt the advance of all three 
armored columns approaching Grozny.38   In Panama, U.S. troops were slightly more 
successful in the residential areas surrounding Albrook Air Station.    Psychological 
operations units used loudspeakers to entice defenders away from areas occupied by 
noncombatants.   Coupled with a display of AC-130 precision firepower nearby, these 
efforts were successful at avoiding collateral damage and loss of life.39  Presented with 
such scenarios,  sensitivity to friendly and noncombatant casualties can become a 
dangerous Achilles' heel for U.S. forces.    Precision-guided munitions (PGM) offer 
commanders some relief, but technological limitations continue to make this tradeoff a 
reality. For the JFC during MOOTW or SASO, this means greatly increased concern for 
the safety of noncombatants, as well as force protection measures for organic assets.  To 
do otherwise might risk collateral loss of life and property, along with friendly public and 
political support. 
6.        Alteration by Terrain of Weapons and Munitions Effects 
Buildings and other manmade structures limit or alter the anticipated effects of 
current weapons systems. Smaller caliber projectiles may be ineffective against hardened 
construction materials, while explosive weapons may cause rubbling that hinders friendly 
maneuver. In Grozny, Chechen rebels used "hugging" - utilizing urban terrain to move 
37
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close enough to Russian forces to make the use of artillery untenable — to negate the 
firepower advantage of their opponents.40 Armored forces often cannot elevate weapon 
systems sufficiently to address threats from upper stories of buildings at close range. The 
firepower advantages normally enjoyed by U.S. forces from artillery and close air support 
are severely reduced by tall structures, as well. During combat operations, American 
forces can quickly find themselves engaged in close-quarters infantry engagements, with 
little support other than organic small arms. Often, the most effective fire support 
weapons are mortars, because of their high ballistic trajectory, and direct-fire antitank 
weaponry. 
For the JFC during operations short of war, these altered effects mean fewer 
options to respond to force protection threats. In contrast, the non-traditional adversary 
can expect greater payoff from unsophisticated weaponry due to secondary effects, and 
the benefit of striking at American public opinion through collateral damage. 
7.        Unique and Demanding Logistics Requirements 
Logistical support must also adapt to the potentially austere urban environment. 
During combat operations, a support system must be responsive to dramatic increases in 
Class IV (construction materials), Class V (ammunition), and Class VIII (medical 
material) requirements. At Stalingrad, the most critical of these supply shortfalls was 
water. Dispersed and decentralized troop units were unable to carry sufficient quantities 
to support themselves for extended periods in isolation. Many fell into the hands of the 
enemy simply because they were too dehydrated to withdraw in good order.   Marshal 
Postgraduate School, 2000. 
40
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Chuikov tells of a battalion commander who reported that his men had taken to firing 
machineguns at drainpipes to see if any water dripped out.41 
Manpower-intensive urban combat will likely see a sharp increase in friendly 
casualties, straining military medical support. Construction materials often amplify the 
weapons effects in cities, and angular surfaces of the manmade environment result in 
increased blunt-trauma injuries. Past MOUT involving combat have consistently 
incurred casualty rates of fifty percent.42 Recent operations in Somalia reflect these 
averages, including the fact that the U.S. died of wounds (DOW) rate has not improved 
since Vietnam. At a recent RAND Urban Operations conference, U.S. Army surgeon 
LTC John Holcomb expressed disbelief that despite these statistics, American forces still 
rely on direct pressure dressings, a two thousand year old technique, to prevent death 
from hemorrhage. Improving this one technique could impact on fifty percent of 
battlefield deaths, and twenty-five percent of all operating room deaths.43 Intense, 
sustained, close-quarter combat has also resulted in considerable psychological casualties 
during urban battles of this century. Russian experiences in Grozny show that their 
health support system was unprepared to deal with this contingency.44 
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Finally, the urban environment uniquely challenges casualty evacuation. The 
non-linear nature of the urban battlefield makes safe evacuation of casualties extremely 
difficult. Casualties within structures are often invisible to engaged friendly forces, 
which may not even be aware of the need for evacuation. When casualties can be 
successfully extracted from battle, air evacuation is often not an option for even the most 
serious casualties due to structures, power lines, or confined spaces. Obviously, during 
non-combat JUO, the specter of urban battle casualties presents a daunting prospect for 
the JFC. 
Perhaps the most significant logistic strain for the JFC conducting MOOTW or 
SASO in cities is the simple presence of noncombatants. Military logistics are designed 
to support their own organizations, and have only recently begun to consider the 
ramifications of treating civilian casualties; feeding, caring, and sheltering scores of 
refugees; or supplying the logistical needs of a damaged urban infrastructure. The 
requirements for such contingencies place exponentially higher demands on our military 
support structure. 
8. Unique Advantages for Defenders, Insurgents, and Terrorists 
In cities, Clausewitz's maxim, "the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically 
stronger than the offensive," holds true.45 In combat, attacking a prepared urban defense 
can be brutally costly. Reinforcing manmade obstacles exacerbate the restrictions urban 
terrain places on maneuver units. The time and manpower necessary to wrest control of a 
city from a determined defender can make attacking very undesirable. Consider the 
earlier example of the Red Force Commander in the 1998 Army After Next Wargame, 
45
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who sought to quickly nullify the Battle Forces maneuver and firepower advantages by 
"going to ground" in cities. A defender aware of the vagaries of U.S. public support may 
be able to succeed against U.S. forces simply by avoiding defeat. Beyond this 
realization, however, JP 3-06 Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations ("First Draff) loses 
clarity by combining these three very different threats without further explanation. 
Particularly in MOOTW or SASO, insurgents, terrorists, and other non-traditional 
threats are not concerned with the advantages they can accrue as conventional defenders. 
Familiar with the terrain, able to blend with the populace, and often with a robust local 
support structure, this opponent can be difficult to identify, let alone neutralize. For this 
reason, the insurgent or terrorist threat becomes first and foremost an intelligence 
challenge. During JUO, the environment drives acute differences in intelligence 
requirements, collection methods, and processes. Intelligence preparation of the 
battlespace (IPB) differs significantly from traditional doctrinal approaches. 
Conventional forces often still follow processes developed in the Cold War-era to 
determine threat order of battle estimates, and to template opponents' most likely or most 
dangerous courses of action. Urban threats do not always fit neatly into these templates, 
because they include regular and irregular threats. There is little in the way of doctrine to 
guide urban task force staffs in producing intelligence estimates for paramilitary, 
criminal, terrorist, and burgeoning insurgent threats. One Defense Intelligence Agency 
officer noted that the J2 Intelligence Officer, early in the 1992-93 Somalia crisis, 
attempted to apply the same techniques used to portray Iraqi order of battle during the 
Gulf War. He states: 
Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 358. 
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When we entered Somalia in December 1992, we had a one-line database 
on the military forces there. Our attempt to use standard collection means 
and strategies was only partially successful because these conventional 
means could not deliver the kind of specific information we wanted. 
There were no Somali motorized rifle or tank divisions, no air defense 
system, no navy, and no air force.46 
He further concludes that military intelligence must pay more attention to 
geography, ecology, history, ethnicity, religion, and politics in their assessments of urban 
threats. Until our forces become more adept at processing and using this unconventional 
intelligence, we will be unable to remove the veil of anonymity that lends terrorists and 
insurgents these advantages. A revealing report on the success of HUMINT and CI 
(Counterintelligence) in Bosnia by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence recognized: 
It [Bosnia] was an environment of terrorists, criminals, and elements of 
the three former warring factions, all of whom were hard to identify but 
were well-armed and had significant intelligence collection capabilities 
including HUMINT. To describe this as a complex and challenging 
environment is an understatement.47 
The report cited several lessons learned that accentuate intelligence differences in 
urban environments. Aside from technological intelligence systems, the Task Force 
Commander was allocated twenty-five CI and tactical HUMINT teams, Defense 
HUMINT Service assets, multinational CI and HUMINT teams, and national agency 
assets. This unprecedented capability increased the need for commanders trained in the 
use of such assets. "Recent contingency operations, especially OOTW.. .have brought CI 
46
 White, Jeffrey B., "A Different Kind of Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." Originally 
published in Studies in Intelligence. Volume 39, Number 5, 1996. Downloaded from 
http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/index.htm, on 15 October 2000. 
47
 Perkins, LTC. "HUMINT/CI," CI and HUMINT Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Intelligence, Department of the Army. Downloaded from 
http://call.anny.rml/call/spcjrocVhummt/humint.htm, on 29 September 2000, p. 9. 
29 
and HUMINT out of the backseat and to the table with other intelligence disciplines."48 
During MOOTW and SASO, JUO force the JFC to consider non-traditional threats, and 
collection methods that task force staffs may be unaccustomed to dealing with. The 
advantages that accrue to these adversaries in cities multiply the threat they pose to 
friendly forces. 
C.        EVOLUTION OF URBAN OPERATIONS 
Urban operations are changing because the manner in which the American 
military conducts all operations is evolving. This evolution is important because it may 
ultimately alter the JP 3-06 characteristics of the operational environment identified 
earlier in the chapter.  New technologies have dramatically expanded the capabilities of 
military forces.  As a result, military planners and commanders envision missions of far 
greater scope and depth than ever before. Military effectiveness increased as operations 
evolved from unilateral efforts to habitual combined arms, then joint operations. Today, 
mission parameters frequently include alliances, coalitions, and multinational efforts, 
leveraging the political power of such agreements.   Operationally, commanders are no 
longer limited to the combat power their forces project. The modern-day prominence of 
civil   affairs   (CA),   psychological   operations   (PSYOP),   public   affairs   (PA),   and 
information operations (10) allow military commanders an unprecedented ability to 
influence perceptions in the area of operations (AO). These capabilities provide military 
leaders with an ever-expanding tool bag for shaping the AO to their advantage.   In the 
past, the importance of influencing perceptions to war fighting was secondary, at best. 
48
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Nearly one hundred years of American military experience creates a powerful paradigm, 
however; one that may be particularly difficult to expand or modify. 
For the better part of a century, conventional maneuver warfare served the 
military forces of America rather well. In World War II, leaders such as Patton, Hodges, 
Bradley, and Truscott, bolstered by overwhelming superiority in air and firepower, 
became highly proficient practitioners of this military art. This preference was also 
demonstrated in the U.S. urban operations conducted throughout this period. A state of 
war justified the use of any and all military means to destroy the enemy, even in civilian 
population centers. As expected, where large numbers of noncombatants were present, 
gross collateral loss of civilian lives was the result. Yet the desire to apply speed, 
maneuver, and firepower to quickly overwhelm the enemy was often blunted in the urban 
environment. At the port of Cherbourg, in June 1944, U.S. and allied forces struggled to 
carve a lodgment area from their D-Day beachhead. The Germans had prepared field and 
permanent fortifications in depth to defend the city. The defenses were bombarded with 
massive air strikes from the IX Bomber Command, and naval gunfire from three 
battleships, four cruisers, and eleven destroyers. Enjoying an attacker to defender force 
ratio of 3 to 1, the entire U.S. VII Corps was launched against the main defensive belt. 
Due largely to assistance from local French Resistance forces, and after six days of street 
fighting, with casualties in the thousands, the city was secured.49 
In 1944, at Aachen, the American army first breached the Siegfried Line in bitter 
house-to-house fighting.  Streetcars filled with dynamite — and painted with the number 
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13 for effect - were rolled down hills into the city in attempts to dislodge the stalwart 
defenders. The German commander commented, "When the Americans start using 155s 
as sniper weapons, it is time to give up."50 Between October 2 and 21, General Hodges' 
First Army sustained nearly 10,000 casualties in urban combat at Aachen.51 Even in the 
Pacific, in February 1945, American forces met fanatical urban defenders at Manila, in 
the Philippines. Attacking the ancient walled garrison of Intramuros, U.S. forces met the 
withering fire of depressed anti-aircraft and naval guns, as well as roads and streets laced 
with naval mines. When the city was finally taken, 16,665 of its roughly 18,000 Japanese 
defenders lay dead.52 
The conflicts following World War II saw no significant change in the techniques 
of urban warfare. When American and South Korean forces liberated Seoul in September 
1950, slow fighting and 2,383 Marine casualties, in addition to thousands of civilian 
casualties, stood in contrast to MacArthur's bold strike at Inchon.53 In 1968 Hue, 
Vietnam, U.S. Marines reversed the gains of the Tet offensive only after nearly a month 
of brutal house-to-house, block-by-block combat. For all of these battles, U.S. forces 
were able to rely on America's full conventional military might. Despite consequent 
gross collateral damage to life and property, high-intensity, unrestricted warfare afforded 
U.S. forces some measure of success. 
50




 Bradley, John H., The West Point Military History Series:  The Second World War (Asia and the 
Pacific). Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc, p. 200. 
53
 U.S. Department of Defense, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, Military 
Operations on Urbanized Terrain CMOUTV Department of the Navy, April 1998, p. 1-10. 
32 
Today, more and more frequently, the U.S. is exercising its military might in 
support of MOOTW, or SASO. Since 1979, when the Army's Field Manual (FM) 90-10 
Military Operations on Urban Terrain was published, new doctrine has increasingly been 
produced that appears to supplant FM 90-10's Cold War-era, combat-only approach to 
urban operations.54 This is not to suggest that traditional urban combat is any less of a 
threat. On the contrary, this potentiality is even more insidious because it may not be 
anticipated. However, the involvement of the U.S. military in MOOTW demonstrates 
that the threat of combat coexists with other mission requirements during peace or 
conflict. Recent deployments to Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Kosovo not only 
illustrate the dangerous potential for lethal urban violence, but also the requirement for 
military capabilities outside traditional combat roles. Inherent in MOOTW is the need 
for, and understanding of, political-military strategy. In a recent RAND study, Mars 
Unmasked, author Sean Edwards contrasts a successfully executed American political- 
military strategy during Operation Just Cause, with a mismatched U.S. strategy in 
Somalia. For the Panama operation, the President's use of the media to rally support, in 
concert with detailed coordination between the military, National Security Council, and 
Department of State, succeeded in responding to political-military issues as they arose. 
54 Among existing joint publications that have a significant stake in urban operations, and take an 
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This was not the case in Mogadishu, where media images of dead Americans were 
combined with the absence of clear national interests. The result was an inability to 
respond to the crisis as it developed, and ultimately a foreign policy failure.55 
The American public's seeming intolerance for friendly and noncombatant loss of 
life also plays an important role in contemporary JUO.  Where the vital interests of the 
United States are not at stake, political leadership may be less willing to accept casualties 
for mission success.   RAND analyst Eric Larson's study, Casualties and Consensus, 
suggests this is not entirely accurate. His findings suggest that the public is as willing as 
ever to accept even severe casualties if the need truly exists, and America's political 
leaders have adequately justified the need for such commitment and sacrifice.56 
Nevertheless, in the conduct of MOOTW, where national interests maybe vague, leaders 
may have  difficulty providing  convincing justification.     Robert B.   Oakley,  U.S. 
Ambassador to Somalia during the Rangers' 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, has stated that 
forces were operating under an "excessive no-casualty edict" from the White House.57 
The result was an asymmetry of commitment, where U.S. forces are deployed in support 
of secondary or tertiary national interests, but the target populace is wholly committed, 
fighting for existence, and far more willing to accept sacrifice. 
It is understandable that, given political sensitivity to casualties and collateral 
damage during operations short of war, our military would seek new means to exert its 
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influence and affect desired outcomes. RAND identifies the presence of media, civil 
affairs, and information operations as factors that have undergone significant change, and 
increased importance, in modern JUO.58 With the advent of portable satellite 
communications (SATCOM), video, and powerful personal computers, media 
representatives can flock to the world's hot spots on a moments notice, and at negligible 
cost. This unprecedented access makes cities natural gathering points for migrating 
media pools. In Chechnya, journalist Carlotta Gall was able to travel with little hindrance 
around the environs of Grozny, twice interviewing Dudayev, the Chechen resistance 
leader, in his secret hideouts.59 As a result, urban military activity of any type often 
receives a disproportionate amount of attention from the press. Not only can such close 
proximity to the cameras result in swift transmission of bad news, evidence suggests it 
can also shape events. Working with the Chief Joint Implementation Commission for 
the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999, Brigadier Jonathan B.A. Bailey noted an almost 
"symbiotic" relationship between the media and rioters during civil disturbances — few 
ever made the effort to riot if no press were present to take their picture.60 
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III.    UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND URBAN OPERATIONS 
Conventional warfare is a method designed for an empty battlefield, 
populated only by the professional soldiers of the contesting armies. 
Unconventional warfare, by contrast, not only recognizes the presence of 
a civil population; by nature, it occurs in the midst of the people.   Its 
terrain is symbolic and lies in the minds of the population.61 
- Thomas K. Adams 
A.        OVERVIEW 
Ordinarily, America's military is not predisposed toward unconventional 
approaches to warfare. In The American Way of War, Russell Weigley portrays Prussian 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz as the principal influence on American military strategy.62 
Clausewitz's ubiquitous influence helps to explain why U.S. doctrine overwhelmingly 
seeks to destroy our enemy's military forces by concentrating our firepower and combat 
forces in decisive battle. His maxim, "The fighting forces [of the enemy] must be 
destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on 
the fight," has been the guiding principle for American maneuver warfare for over a 
century.63 Blitzkrieg, the Arab-Israeli Wars, AirLand Battle, and Desert Storm have all 
validated Clausewitzian theory - although "other means" may be important, they are 
subordinate to military means. Indeed, in the insightful book The Western Way of War, 
Victor Hanson argues that our concept of decisive battle is inextricably enmeshed with 
our Western democratic heritage. Many military leaders see this "pitched battle" concept 
as "the only way to defeat an enemy," where superior mass and firepower "find and 
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engage [the enemy] in order to end the entire business as quickly as possible."64 This 
approach was evident in Vietnam, as American forces - denied the clear-cut certainty of 
decisive battle - used body count to gauge when enemy forces would be "put in such a 
condition that they [could] no longer carry on the fight." When faced with an opponent 
that refuses to meet our conventionally superior forces on equal terms, but seeks to attack 
them indirectly, we react with distaste. We neatly label such enemies guerrillas, 
irregulars, or unconventional. Our predisposition for overwhelming conventional might 
is apparent. 
Regardless of America's superiority on the conventional maneuver battlefield, 
unconventional threats may still threaten our forces asymmetrically if we are not vigilant. 
B.H. Liddell Hart's seminal work, Strategy, cautions that consistently successful 
commanders never directly attack an enemy firmly in position. Hart's "indirect 
approach" prescribes that, "instead of seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by one's 
attack, it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully launched."65 This 
flexibility is precisely the component the unconventional warrior brings to the 
asymmetry, complexity, and uncertainty of today's urban environment. By examining 
the Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission, in relation to the eight operational 
environment characteristics presented in Chapter n, this chapter illustrates the unique 
suitability of UW for contemporary Joint Urban Operations (JUO). 
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Unconventional warfare generally describes those ill defined, shifting forms of 
conflict that do not follow the conventions of military thought. According to JP 1-02, 
UW is defined as: 
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of 
long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces 
who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying 
degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other 
direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as 
the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and 
evasion and escape.66 
The responsibility for UW falls not to Department of Defense (DoD) general- 
purpose forces, but to U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) units of the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM). SF units may be assisted or facilitated in 
conducting UW by Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units, 
which also fall under USSOCOM. 
B.        THE MISSION AND MEN 
When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying 
every relevant - and many an irrelevant - factor. Geography, tribal 
structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards - all 
were at my finger-ends.  The enemy I knew almost like my own side.67 
- I.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) 
1.        Reduced Technological Advantages 
When U.S forces enter an environment that seriously degrades the performance of 
technology that those forces depend on, mission accomplishment is at risk. Most 
important to U.S. forces is reduced intelligence, where conventional forces are reliant on 
66
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technical collection methods. UW offers a low-technology alternative, relying on SF 
personnel, and indigenous or surrogate forces, to build influence and achieve objectives. 
UW intelligence activities are not as vulnerable to the debilitating effects of urban terrain; 
UW methods focus on human sources of intelligence (HUMINT), which cannot be 
collected by space-age overhead platforms. This focus is ideal for urban contingencies, 
where HUMINT plays a greater role than is the norm in other operations. In 1993 
Mogadishu, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) representative noted that the existing 
J2 capabilities were not sufficient to meet the commander's demands: "Someone was 
needed to locate and count them [clan vehicles] from the ground and to find out if they 
were operable. Eventually, we got this information, and even better intelligence on the 
clan forces' capabilities, from U.S. Special Forces (SF) units."68 
Another example highlights the different focus of UW intelligence activities. 
Prior to the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Riyadh, tactical HUMINT, with operational 
and strategic implications, is precisely what was lacking. Secretary of Defense William 
Perry's DoD report to the President confirmed that the intelligence community in Saudia 
Arabia was providing 24-hour estimates and updates, and that this information was 
widely and effectively distributed. Despite this, the intelligence architecture was 
"lacking in at least one key area ~ that of providing tactical seaming [sic] of impending 
attack."69 With a cross-cultural capability lacking in general-purpose forces, and training 
68
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in HUMINT collection methods, SF units might have bolstered the force protection effort 
in Riyadh. 
The tools of the trade and skills required of conventional combat maneuver units 
are less germane during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability 
and Support (SASO), a fact acknowledged by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Shalikashvili in excerpts from Joint Vision 2010 and the 1995 National Military 
Strategy.70 The set of skills possessed by our unconventional warriors, however, is 
germane. The mission focus of UW is primarily on political-military objectives: existing 
or potential insurgent, secessionist, religious, or other resistance movements. Dissident 
elements are the key to UW potential in any region. As long as dissident factions exist in 
cities, there will be UW potential to support U.S. national interests. SF skills are applied 
toward UW objectives such as: undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of 
a target authority; neutralizing, or shifting the target authority's power to the dissident 
element; undermining the confidence and will of the target authority's leadership; 
isolating the target authority from external sources of diplomatic or physical support, 
while facilitating such support for the dissident element; and obtaining either the support 
or the neutrality of various other segments of the society.71 In the struggle for influence, 
and building rapport, SF competencies in understanding the human elements of conflict 
far exceed the value of technical means. For this reason, UW in cities is not hampered by 
incapacitated technology. 
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2.        Increased Demands for Manpower 
During MOOTW and SASO, it may be desirable to avoid the impression that 
coalition forces are occupying forces, in order to avoid heightening existing tensions with 
a very large conventional ground force deployment.  UW does not present the immense 
"footprint"  that   large-scale   conventional   troop   deployments   do.     Special  Forces 
Operational   Detachment-Alphas   (SFODAs)   ~   the   SF   elements   responsible   for 
conducting UW ~ are twelve-man teams.   In addition, though SFODAs are capable of 
conducting UW  unilaterally,  UW  is  "predominantly conducted by indigenous  or 
surrogate forces...and directed in varying degrees by an external source."    This 
operational method farther reduces the signature of U.S. involvement.   In an uncertain 
environment, where tensions are already high, a low-visibility method of achieving 
operational objectives reduces the risk of incident. If even greater anonymity is required, 
SFODAs can conduct or direct covert and clandestine operations in support of their UW 
objectives.  As an economy of force measure, UW would also free manpower for force 
protection and other operational missions. 
Manpower intensive operations also put more personnel in harm's way. The risk 
of incident, and impact on American public support, rises commensurately. Minimizing 
the risk of incident is important to policymakers for this reason. Some postulate that an 
"offset" method of employing troops will minimize or eliminate contact between our 
troops and the indigenous populace. In Denying the Widow-Maker: Summary of 
Proceedings; RAND-DBBL Conference on MOUT. Dr. Russell Glenn discusses "offset 
operations": 
Operations in which friendly forces engage the enemy or interact with 
noncombatants from remote locations.    The offset acts to reduce the 
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exposure of friendly forces to enemy action or other threats. Engaging 
from offset positions requires accurate, timely intelligence and precision 
munitions.72 
As proposed by Dr. Glenn, the "offset" method focuses on technological 
reconnaissance and surveillance, and precision guided munitions (PGM). By keeping 
friendly forces far off in a remote location, threat forces can be engaged without risk of 
American casualties. While the technology required may currently be problematic, and 
PGM are hopefully unnecessary during MOOTW or SASO, the concept of limited 
exposure is attractive. UW can provide a similar offset benefit to friendly forces, albeit 
with a slightly greater degree of exposure and risk. Acting from a secure, neutral 
location, SF units can train, organize, and equip surrogate forces to further U.S. policy 
objectives. Friendly exposure is minimized, and U.S. commanders can actively influence 
or manipulate the informal power hierarchies in the target location. Particularly during 
MOOTW, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units that help shape the perceptions of the 
target populace, and Civil Affairs (CA) units — indispensable during post-conflict 
resolution, can support SF efforts. 
3.        Decentralization 
In cities during MOOTW, decentralized ground operations become problematic 
for U.S. commanders. Conventional maneuver units are trained to accomplish war- 
fighting missions. Squads achieve objectives in support of platoon objectives, which in 
turn achieve their objectives in support of company, battalion and brigade missions. SF 
units are not designed to replace the missions these units accomplish. However, these 
units do not habitually operate in isolation from parent units, and seldom — if ever — do 
72Glenn, Russell W., Steeb, Randall, et. al., Denying the Widow-Maker:   Summary of Proceedings: 
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their tactical combat missions have operational or strategic intent. When JUO, 
particularly combat operations, devolve into squad-level actions and below, junior 
leadership rarely has the training to smoothly assume such responsibility. Command and 
control (C2) is severely strained by dispersion - conventional forces must adapt and alter 
standard operating procedures (SOP). This is not the case in the conduct of UW. The 
SFODA is the operational element for UW, and it is SOP for the team to split into two 
six-man elements, or four three-man elements, in the performance of its mission. Most 
importantly, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives, and is in support 
of U.S. national security objectives.73 
Certain unique capabilities and attributes of the SF operators that conduct UW 
facilitate their success in a highly decentralized, uncertain environment. Field Manual 
(FM) 100-25 (1999) describes the SF soldier as a "mature, innovative, culturally aware, 
self-assured, self-reliant" professional.74 These attributes are a product of a very 
competitive selection process that yields high-quality soldiers, advanced technological 
training and education, and experience gained through the unique profiles of the missions 
these professionals execute. 
A recent Special Forces Pipeline Review, conducted by a team of psychologists, 
studied whether the selection and training process for Army SF candidates continues to 
produce soldiers who possess the attributes required for success in their operational 
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environment. The answer was a resounding yes. The researchers, along with SF subject 
matter experts, identified 29 "critical performance attributes," all of which were linked to 
job requirements.75 Of these attributes, the ten most critical were identified as: team 
player, maturity, judgment and decision-making ability, dependability, adaptability, 
cultural/interpersonal adaptability, physical endurance, initiative, perseverance, and 
autonomy. In 1999, the annual Special Forces Branch Conference included a symposium 
to determine how selection and training must evolve to ensure that these individual 
qualities are best identified and cultivated.76 SF's periodic reassessments illustrate a 
continuing dedication to fielding a force of professionals exemplifying these attributes, 
and ensure a force that remains organized and trained for success. Specifically, SF has 
fostered attributes most desirable for urban practitioners of UW. 
An adjunct to decentralized operations is the coalition or multinational nature of 
many contemporary JUO during MOOTW. SF is accustomed to working with militaries 
of other nations. Their linguistic capability, as well as cross-cultural training and 
experience, assist SFODAs in coordinating with foreign military personnel, civilian 
leadership, and coalition partners. In peacetime, deployed SFODAs routinely hone their 
UW skills by exercising America's engagement strategies around the globe. 
4.        Increased Demands for Time 
Conventional force commanders seek swift, decisive conclusions to ground 
operations; during MOOTW, this expectation may not be feasible. Though policymakers 
might favor scheduled, near-term exit strategies, the complexities of peace operations, 
75
 Zazanis, Michelle M., et. al., "Special Forces Selection and Training:  Meeting the Needs of the 
Force in 2020," Special Warfare, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1999, p. 24. 
76
 Ibid., p. 28. 
45 
and our experiences in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, prove this an unlikely 
possibility. Fortunately, the expectation for executing UW is "normally of long 
duration," as well. Many of the complexities that make MOOTW so time consuming 
(coalition building, diplomatic initiatives, reducing ethnic friction, etc.) are familiar 
conditions to UW practitioners. SFODAs conducting UW as part of coalition support 
operations are known as Special Forces Liaison Elements (SFLEs). SFLEs can assess, 
equip, and advise coalition forces.77 
The small operational footprint of UW can also make the long-duration nature of 
JUO more palatable. Less media exposure, less contact between combat troops and 
noncombatants, and less operational cost, might make longer operational commitments 
more feasible and politically tolerable. 
5. Unique Constraints 
Combat and combat support units in the military rarely train on noncombatant 
scenarios. The restrictive urban rules of engagement (ROE) imposed on such 
conventional forces can significantly impact or alter the SOPs those forces are habituated 
to in training. In contrast, SF is always operationally employed among, or in close 
proximity to, noncombatants of many cultures worldwide. UW demands proficiency in 
rapport building, winning allegiance, and cross-cultural communication. SFODAs often 
coordinate with foreign military leadership, civilian authorities, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), other government agencies (OGA), and international organizations 
during interagency operations. Many times relationships fostered between SFODAs and 
foreign officials during peacetime deployments create operational leverage during crisis. 
77 U.S. Department of Defense, Special Forces Operations Doctrine. FM 3-05.20 (FD), Department of 
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These relationships, especially when SF are directing indigenous or surrogate forces to 
influence a target authority, prove invaluable in avoiding direct friction between U.S. 
troops and local civilians. UW can actually serve to reduce the potential for 
noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. Finally, by acting through indigenous or 
surrogate forces, ROE necessary for large units of conventional troops are no longer 
needed. 
6. Alteration by Terrain of Weapons and Munitions Effects 
Obviously, combat operations should be used as means of last resort during 
MOOTW or SASO. Mogadishu and recent experiences in the Balkans, however, 
illustrate that the potential for lethal military or political violence exists anytime, 
anywhere. Urban terrain, particularly where a large troop presence is in close proximity 
to the civilian populace, also increases the likelihood that such violence will cause 
collateral damage and loss of life for noncombatants. 
UW avoids the large troop presence. In addition, surrogate forces might be more 
inclined to avoid situations that would cause collateral loss of life to the indigenous 
population. If U.S. direct action becomes necessary, the presence of a highly trained 
SFODA conducting UW provides the JFC a responsive option. This combat capability 
would be the least desirable way of employing a UW element, but might preclude a 
costly, politically untenable, less responsive, conventional force deployment. 
7. Unique and Demanding Logistics Requirements 
UW avoids the massive logistical needs of conventional force deployments. 
Though UW could conceivably replace a conventional force mission in an exceptional 
the Army, 8 December 2000, p. 2-7. 
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instance, the SF mission is better suited as a combat-multiplier for the JFC, freeing 
conventional manpower for force protection and other vital Joint Task Force (JTF) 
concerns. 
Operational units have been known to require ten support personnel for every one 
operationally employed soldier, meaning a very large and costly projection to the area of 
operations  (AO).     SF  is not  self-supporting;  however, they do  require far less 
organizational support than other units. While influencing a particular social group in the 
indigenous society, and in tandem with surrogate forces, SFODAs can utilize an 
Auxiliary. This organization acts as the internal support organization of the social group 
or dissident element.   Its operation is both covert and clandestine in nature, and its 
members are not openly associated with the dissident element.   In a more permissive 
environment, SFODAs are comfortable existing off the local economy, and require 
minimal external support. Doctrinally, UW maximizes the logistic potential of the AO to 
meet the supply needs of the SFODA.   Each team member conducts an independent 
assessment of existing logistical sources within the AO.   These assessments include a 
thorough review of indigenous medical personnel and facilities, existing communications 
architecture, and local sources of food, water, and resupply.   This standard planning 
process ensures SF soldiers are best prepared to adapt to any contingency, without relying 
on external sources of supply. 
SFODAs do possess certain unique capabilities lacking in smaller conventional 
units. SFODA medical sergeants deploy with significant amounts of Class VIU (medical 
material), prescription medication, and trauma, dental, and veterinary kits. Portable x-ray 
machines and advanced medical equipment are available if the mission requires it. 
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Communications sergeants not only possess organic FM, VHF, and SATCOM, but 
mechanical and solar generators to replenish power sources for these systems. All 
personnel carry water purifiers, and survival gear not issued to conventional troops. 
8.        Unique Advantages for Defenders, Insurgents, and Terrorists 
That the prominence of SF, CA, and PSYOP has increased during recent urban 
operations should not be surprising. Conventional forces have proven very vulnerable to 
non-traditional threats, and asymmetric attacks can rapidly undermine American public 
support for MOOTW and SASO. CA units address one of the characteristics most 
distinguishing cities from other terrain types: the populace. These inhabitants comprise 
the workforce that mans the complex urban infrastructure. They have the potential to 
become divided along political, ethnic, religious, and economic lines, and they become 
the refugees when political conflict turns violent. According to FM 41-10 Civil Affairs 
Operations, Civil Affairs (CA) personnel are responsible for minimizing civilian 
interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the 
populace; coordinating military operations with civilian agencies and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs); and providing expertise in civil-sector functions normally 
associated with civilian authorities, in order to implement U. S. policy.78 In Panama 
City, after Operation Just Cause, CA units restored basic infrastructure services, 
established a police force, and supervised food distribution during Operation Promote 
Liberty.79 CA efforts reinforced by Psychological Operations, helped shape the 
perceptions of the populace, in order to quell further resistance.   Where military forces 
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February 2000, p. 2-1. 
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are employed in close proximity to noncombatants, and particularly during post-conflict 
resolution, CA will continue to play a prominent role. 
In Mars Unmasked, the author states that his recent case studies reflect a trend 
favoring low-intensity forces.80  Edwards notes such conflicts usually involve increased 
political constraints on the use of force, and opponents who generally seek to avoid 
warfare on open ground, where the U.S. can bring its firepower and maneuver superiority 
to bear. Such a strategy entails a higher risk of protracted conflict, and targets the will of 
the American public, rather than American military forces.   He states, "all of these 
political, technological, and social developments increase the importance of information 
operations (and related activities) during urban operations.  Information operations (10) 
focus on the perception and will of the people fighting the war, the support of the 
domestic population at home, as well as the support of the indigenous population in the 
urban operations theater. More opportunities exist than ever before to subdue the will of 
the enemy through information manipulation."81    Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and 
Psychological Operations units can all support an integrated information strategy.   The 
significance   of the  ubiquitous   media  on  domestic  U.S.   support  can  never  be 
overemphasized.   A well-integrated information strategy can effectively sell American 
policy objectives, and show military success stories in their best light during MOOTW or 
A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 72. 
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 This view is reflected by other authors. Martin Van Crevald argues that war by major states has 
become less and less viable for attaining political ends because of the presence of nuclear weapons (see 
Van Crevald, Martin, The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press, 1991). See also Alexander, 
Bevin> The Future of Warfare, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1995; and Arquilla, John, and Ronfeldt' 
David, In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. RAND, MR-880-OSD Santa 
Monica, 1997. 
81 Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations. RAND, MR-1173- 
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SASO. In combat, psychological operations can undermine the will and cohesiveness of 
our adversaries, and civil affairs personnel can address the many needs of the indigenous 
population, building rapport and garnering local support for U.S. military forces. 
Additionally, these forces are frequently more culturally attuned to foreign societies, and 
accustomed to dealing with the obstacles of unfamiliar languages and customs. 
What is clear is that asymmetric attacks on conventional forces alone enjoy 
certain advantages. During MOOTW in cities, American forces are far more likely to 
face these non-traditional adversaries than conventional, symmetric attacks. In this arena, 
SF possesses a conceptual understanding of insurgency and asymmetric threats, and is 
ideally suited to counter them in the urban environment. 
A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 47. 
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IV.    BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA 
There is for a commander nothing more oppressive than a situation which 
is not clear, nothing more trying than bands of armed irregular troops, 
aided by the population and the nature of the county and relying for 
support on a strong army in the neighborhood.82 
- Prince Charles (1870) 
A.       BACKGROUND 
The following case illustrates how Army Special Forces were used to fill an 
operational void during Operation Allied Force in Bosnia - Herzegovina. This example 
details, from December 1996 to April 1999, the scope of activities performed by 
deployed SFODAs of Second Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), in Brcko, 
and the Joint Paramilitary Commission. The intent is not to give an exhaustive historical 
account of the conflict, but to highlight how UW skills were employed to understand, 
shape, and engage in this area of urban operations. Teams initially provided tactical 
intelligence otherwise unavailable, and later, leveraged rapport and relationships to 
achieve military and policy objectives. 
On November 21, 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, the warring parties of the former 
Yugoslavia signed a peace agreement that brought to a halt three years of interethnic civil 
strife. The Dayton Agreement divides Bosnia and Herzegovina roughly equally between 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska. In 
1995-96, a NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops served 
in Bosnia to implement and monitor the military aspects of the agreement.  IFOR was 
82
 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Unconventional 
Warfare: Summary Sheet Packet, Special Forces Officer Qualification Course Material, November 1991, p. 
16. 
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succeeded by a smaller, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) whose mission was to 
deter renewed hostilities. As part of Operation Joint Endeavor, deployed U.S. forces 
within this multinational setting established a doctrinal Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF Eagle), and subordinate Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). In 1997, 
the mission was renamed Operation Joint Guard. 
B.        UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS IN BOSNIA 
Although Army SF units were among the first U.S. forces to deploy to Bosnia, 
few of their activities fit neatly into the doctrinal missions of FM 100-25 Doctrine for 
Army Special Operations Forces, or FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. 
The closest doctrinal description of these activities was "Coalition Support," an SF 
Collateral Activity  FM 100-25 describes Coalition Support as encompassing the training 
of coalition partners, providing them communications, integrating them into the coalition 
C2 and intelligence structure, and providing liaison elements to facilitate the JFC's C2.83 
Coalition Support Teams (CSTs) provided such assistance during Operation Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, and were renamed Liaison Coordination Elements (LCEs) prior 
to Bosnia.  The responsibilities of these teams expanded, but no doctrine existed for the 
LCE, so the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) created the LCE Handbook to "lay out 
the critical areas of responsibility," and establish the following definition: 
An LCE is a joint special operations element which conducts liaison and 
coordination between a division level headquarters and its subordinate 
brigades/battalions, when those elements do not have common 
communications equipment or architecture, or may not share common 
operational procedures, or when a significant language barrier exists. It is 
employed  when  a senior  headquarters  has  subordinate  elements  of 
83
 U.S.  Department of Defense,  Doctrine for Armv Special Operations Forces   FM  100-25 
Department of the Army, August 1999, p. 2-13. 
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differing national origins who do not have a habitual relationship.84 
The Mission Essential Task List (METL) for the LCE allowed the SFODAs to 
develop the missions flexibly. Teams were tasked to deploy; build rapport; provide 
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); conduct TGO; maintain 
mobility; and redeploy/recover. An example would be the SFODA that acted as the 
Hungarian Engineer Battalion (HUBAT) LCE. This element provided the 
communications link between HUBAT and all SFOR elements, ensured communications 
connectivity, and conducted liaison between HUBAT and SFOR headquarters. The team 
also assisted and advised HUBAT command and staff in the preparation of their 
operations orders. During this period, SFODAs were primarily facilitating understanding 
of the operational environment.85 
In subsequent rotations to Bosnia, SF units assumed the Joint Commission 
Observer (JCO) mission from British forces. JCO teams were tasked with "providing 
ground truth" for the JTF Commander. This was also not a U.S. doctrinal mission, so the 
SF elements adopted the name from the British and established mission parameters 
themselves. An Operations Officer in 10th SFG(A), refining the METL established for 
LCEs, published a JCO Handbook. This document outlined the METL in task, condition, 
standard format, and contained tactics, techniques, and procedures for employment. 
These tasks included: objectively represent political views between entities; coordinate 
PSYOP to support the political posture of the JCO team and SFOR; conduct area 
84
 First Battalion,  10* Special Forces Group (Airborne), LCE Handbook. 21 November 1995, 
Stuttgart, Germany, p. 5. 
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assessment/assess host nation forces; develop/maintain rapport; develop and maintain an 
auxiliary; assess reliable, accurate, and honest contacts; develop and maintain a network; 
and synchronize NGO/IO efforts with IFOR. These responsibilities far exceed those 
originally envisioned by collateral activities doctrine. Most notably, many of these 
mission parameters are extremely similar to SF's UW mission. During UW, SFODAs 
establish rapport; conduct area assessments, and assess existing resistance organizations; 
and establish intelligence, operational, and support networks, including an auxiliary. The 
JCO Handbook even urges units to "use the Unconventional Warfare area assessment 
format because it fits the mission the best."86 SFODAs were now shaping the AO to 
facilitate meeting the requirements of the JTF. 
In Multinational Division-North (MND-N), the Brcko JCO frequently responded 
to demonstrations and bombings to provide rapid assessments to JTF headquarters, and to 
establish a visible presence to prevent further violence.    The team was effective at 
preventing escalation because of the local rapport they had established, and the inter- 
personal relationships they had fostered over time. The JCO team's network of contacts 
was extensive, and included: the Brcko Mayor; local religious leaders (Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic, and Muslim mufti); Presidents and Vice-Presidents of local labor organizations; 
local police, Specialist Police, and paramilitary officials, including the Brcko Police 
Chief, Internal Division Chief, criminal investigators, and the Grahic Police Chief; local 
government  ministers;   Chetnik party  leadership;   local  media representatives;   the 
Ambassador   of the   Office   of the   UN   High   Representative;   non-governmental 
organization (NGO) representatives including the Red Cross, United Nations Office of 
86 First Battalion,  10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), LCE Handbook. 21 November 1995, 
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the High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), and I-PTF; local residents and business 
owners and many others. Multiple patrols daily, and such liaison contacts allowed the 
JCO team access to local officials, as well as a certain amount of status and authority in 
the community. In some instances, this enabled the early warning necessary for the team 
to defuse potential trouble. 
Because of the SFODA's organic satellite communications (SATCOM) 
capability, another MND-North JCO in Serbrenik was often tasked to report updates on 
freedom of movement within the area of operations (AO), and actions of political 
personalities. At the time, the team's ability to communicate tactical intelligence to 
higher headquarters quickly was unique. This capability also enabled the team to 
accomplish the unusual task of informing targeted individuals of death threats that had 
been intercepted within the community. Timely response was often the only method of 
preventing the escalation of political violence. 
This JCO team was able to use its contacts to report how well multiethnic 
organizations monitored by the Joint Task Force (JTF) were actually integrated. 
Frequently, black-marketers and other criminal elements would attempt to associate with 
members of the JCO team in order to bolster their own status in the community, and 
ostensibly to gather any intelligence on SFOR intentions that they could. This allowed 
the SFODA to report on local individuals attempting to buy or sell small arms and other 
weapons. Information on black marketers was so good, the team was able to create a 
personality matrix linking many local operators. 
Stuttgart, Germany, p. 10. 
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Two particular organizations, the Regular Police and Specialist Police, wielded 
significant formal and informal authority over the local inhabitants.    Despite the 
prominent status and role of these police forces, the normal JTF staff was not organized 
to handle this direct liaison effectively.     The JTF intelligence infrastructure was 
organized to  execute doctrinal processes,  analyzing inputs from  a large pool of 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence sources, and providing timely estimates to 
the commander.   Major General (MG) David L. Grange, TF Eagle Commander, was 
conspicuous in his "on the scene" style of command, frequently on the ground throughout 
his entire AOR to get a personal feel for the operational situation. In his estimation, the 
normal staff processes were not providing him the leverage he needed; his existing 
traditional  intelligence  infrastructure  was  not  adequate.87     Grange  wanted   solid 
intelligence on the paramilitary and non-traditional groups in his AOR to learn their 
disposition and intentions, which groups might pose serious threats to friendly forces, and 
how these groups might be influenced to contribute to stability and his mission 
objectives.88 
As early as July 1997, Specialist Police (SP) leadership began to threaten JCO 
teams in the AO following SFOR actions they felt undermined their authority. MG 
Grange attempted to engage in dialog with these leaders, but was unable devote the time 
The details of this example were related to the author in a phone interview with COL Tim 
Heinemann on September 19, 2000, and e-mail with the author on November 8, 2000. COL Heinemann, 
an Army Special Forces officer, is currently the Dean of Academics, U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1997, COL Heinemann was asked by MG Grange to come to 
Bosnia to fill what he saw as a critical intelligence gap in TF Eagle's area of responsibility. From August 
1997 to January 1998, COL Heinemann and one senior Army Special Forces NCO acted as the Joint 
Paramilitary Commission, establishing critical liaison with irregular and paramilitary forces in the region. 
Their actions during this period provided the CJTF with critical and responsive intelligence not provided by 
the traditional infrastructure of the organization. 
88
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and effort personally to establish a negotiation strategy with concrete objectives. MG 
Grange requested Colonel (COL) Tim Heinemann from 10 SFG(A), and chartered him 
to develop a strategy that leveraged Regular Police and SP influence, in order to facilitate 
MND-N's role in executing the Dayton Accords. His intent was also to ensure COL 
Heinemann was engaged prior to the conventional force transition from the 1st Infantry 
Division to the 1st Armored Division, in order to maintain rapport with these local 
leaders. Subsequently, COL Heinemann established the Joint Paramilitary Commission 
(JPC). This organization and its objectives maximized the potential of the JCOs, and 
moved SF into the realm of active engagement within the AOR. 
MG Grange described COL Heinemann as was more than successful in his liaison 
with General Borovcanin of the Regular Police, and General Goran Saric of the SP. 
Grange felt the JCOs and JPC were no less than invaluable to him, and "gave [him] the 
pulse of what was going on" in and around Brcko.89 Heinemann was able to gain the 
personal assurances of Saric that there would be no targeting of TF Eagle personnel. He 
sold Saric on the concept of shaping the future of his Specialist Police by cooperating 
with MND-N. COL Heinemann based his leverage on the prospect of Saric developing 
habitual relations with 10th SFG(A) as a springboard for getting his organization back 
into the business of professional counter-terrorism. Saric feared his local competitors — 
Muslim and Croat paramilitary groups ~ would get ahead of him in this goal. COL 
Heinemann quickly determined that Saric was his priority target; "first among equals." 
Traveling constantly between the towns of Brcko, Bijeljna, Janja, and throughout 
Republika Srpska, COL Heinemann kept his finger on the pulse of the urban community. 
89 Phone interview with MG Grange, 19 March 2001. 
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Because of the relationships, rapport, and personal credibility COL Heinemann built with 
these and other paramilitary leaders, he was able to provide an unparalleled intelligence 
picture to the commander. 
COL Heinemann found himself simultaneously coaching Saric, promoting his 
interests, and often protecting him from SFOR and MND-N players who wished to shut 
down his police organization. COL Heinemann saw Saric's organization as MG 
Grange's 5th Brigade; a "rogue" brigade that could be leveraged for effects without 
committing U.S. forces. Heinemann was able to sell Grange on this "economy of force 
measure," but did not feel his successor (MG Ellis) really exploited its potential. 
Constant contact with local personalities, and understanding the hierarchy of 
power they fit into, was crucial for predicting ethnic friction, leveraging local popular 
support, and pre-empting crisis when necessary. 
One crisis occurred at Doboj in October 1997, when evidence suggested five 
officers of an SP detachment had violated the law by protecting wanted Serb political 
figures. Based on General Shinseki's decision, MND-N was poised to take the SP 
detachment down by force. On 9 October, Heinemann met in Sarajevo with Shinseki, his 
staff, and MND-N Commanding General (CG), MG Ellis. Heinemann openly disagreed 
with the decision to punish the five officers, and instead proposed to reconstitute the 
entire SP detachment as the first detachment to re-certify as part of the new police force 
in Republic Srpska ~ a major military and policy objective for SFOR. Shinseki agreed 
with this approach. 
On 11 October, the day the operation was to be executed, MG Ellis was unable to 
secure Saric's cooperation, so the order was given to launch the Danish Battalion in 
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Doboj to take down the detachment by force. Heinemann stayed with Saric in Janja, and 
was able to convince him to give in at the last moment. The JPC's SATCOM link 
allowed Heinemann to contact Ellis directly, who aborted the operation just in time. 
Saric later confided to Heinemann that together they had averted an extended Serb UW 
campaign. Had his detachment been attacked, he felt his position would have afforded 
him no other choice but to support a Bosnia-wide retaliation. 
Heinemann was subsequently successful in convincing the senior U.S. chain of 
command to embrace General Saric and his organization. Eventually enlisting the 
support of General Shinseki, COL Heinemann brokered a meeting between General 
Shelton and Saric. More than pleased with his status among the Americans and his 
relationship with COL Heinemann, Saric, and later Borovcanin, was instrumental in 
establishing the new Srpska Police Force, and supporting the "new order" that paved the 
way for legitimate elections. 
As a result of his experiences in Bosnia, COL Heinemann offered valuable 
insights. In his estimation, the current JTF structure is inadequate to the task of large, 
multinational urban operations. Two Deputy JTF Commanders would be better suited to 
the task, one presiding over operations, the other orchestrating support. In addition, he 
feels a single Chief of Staff is also inadequate for the heavy administrative burden of 
such urban operations. A Chief of Staff cell, or directorate, could better preside over the 
myriad infrastructure, bureaucratic, and staff-intensive complexities of a multinational 
urban operation. Lastly, in the specific case of the JPC, he recommends a comprehensive 
"targeting board" be established at the TF level. This unconventional intelligence 
targeting board would not cover traditional, conventional strike objectives.   Instead, it 
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would synthesize and track operations to identify, influence, exploit, and interdict key 
players and relationships in any given local power hierarchy. Such methods are used by 
other intelligence agencies, as well as law enforcement organizations, but this approach 
should be tactically oriented, and responsive to the local JTF commander's requirements. 
Civil Affairs (CA) personnel currently utilize such information (as provided by other 
intelligence sources), but do not possess the capabilities to generate such products. 
Additionally, such capabilities would label CA personnel as intelligence gatherers, 
making them anathema to many suspicious regimes, severely limiting their access and 
ability to do their jobs. 
Personnel specially trained in unconventional warfare methods, and experienced 
in foreign internal defense missions would be ideally suited to managing such an 
unconventional targeting cell. SF personnel possess much of the training and cross- 
cultural experience desirable for such a group. COL Heinemann insists, however, that a 
cell in the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) would not provide the status 
necessary for such a group, or sufficient access to the information produced, for a JTF 
commander. He recommends such an organization be integrated into the extant 
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) intelligence architecture. Most importantly, the 
relationships and rapport COL Heinemann was so successful in cultivating take time to 
establish. He notes: 
Many...did not grasp some of the very basics in dealing with the human 
dimension of complex battlespace. SF's experience in the field puts them 
in the position of living by their wits keenly attuned to all players at all 
levels of battlespace, where frequently it is the apparently minor player, 
who in the end may have a major impact on operations. It takes time to 
develop these instincts...the fact that our chains of command are 
repeatedly and institutionally predisposed to accept risk in allowing 
independent operators under mission-type orders to go forth and do their 
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best,   provides  the   environment   in  which  these   instincts   are  best 
developed.90 
This leverage cannot be created in an ad-hoc manner, or applied only when the 
best-laid plans go awry. These capabilities must be fostered from the outset of any urban 
operation. Urban operations reveal a host of new complexities and costs to military 
planners, much in the way expanding warfare to the undersea and space environments 
add new dimensions to conflict. 
90
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
You [Special Forces] only traverse the physical terrain to get to the 
human terrain.91 
- COL(Ret) August G. Jannarone 
A.        OVERVIEW 
This analysis addresses the relevance of the Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
mission to contemporary Joint Urban Operations (JUO) during Military Operations Other 
Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support (SASO). In 1994, a Defense Science 
Board report concluded that America's ability to conduct military operations in built-up 
areas was inadequate.92 Since that finding, progress has been far too slow. True, 
rewrites are in the works, and experimentation is gaining momentum, yet our military 
still references urban doctrine as outdated as 1979.93 Advances in technology, renewed 
interest in JUO, and recent operational examples - from Mogadishu and Grozny, to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo - should catalyze the development of better operational 
methods for cities. It is apparent that U.S. forces can expect to be committed increasingly 
to urban areas. The appealing nature of the asymmetric advantages offered by cities, and 
our current national security strategy, contributes to this realization. Unfortunately, our 
current doctrine seldom addresses this unique environment; when it does, its predominant 
focus is on conventional, high-intensity, unrestricted maneuver warfare. This approach 
simply does not acknowledge the realities of contemporary JUO.  During MOOTW and 
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 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), "Special Forces 
Branch Conference," Author attended at John F. Kennedy Auditorium, Ardennes St., Ft. Bragg, NC, 3-5 
April 2001. 
92
 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Operations in Built-up Areas 
(MOBA). (November 1994) 1. 
65 
SASO, casualties, collateral damage, and political consequences can rapidly erode public 
support; conventional combat operations may entail excessive political risk. Forces 
trained for unit maneuver warfare are not sufficient for stabilizing politically charged 
conflicts short of war. Operations during peacetime and conflict, particularly where less 
than vital national interests are at stake, may make it difficult to justify the level of 
destruction and bloodshed often associated with urban combat. This doctrinal 
shortcoming is detrimental to how we train, and the methods by which we task organize 
our joint task forces. If not rectified, U.S. military leaders hazard continuously creating 
ad-hoc forces ill-prepared to confront the complexities of modern JUO. 
One answer is the effectiveness of using politically and culturally attuned SF, 
trained and experienced in irregular methods, to conduct UW to counter urban threats. 
We must not limit today's JFC to forces designed for high-intensity, maneuver warfare. 
Providing commanders with the proper tools to counter asymmetric threats will ensure 
deployed forces have the requisite capabilities for operating in cities. 
B.        UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
The freedom from reliance on high-technology systems, minimal operational 
footprint through use of surrogate forces, and unique applicability for countering 
asymmetric adversaries, make UW eminently suitable for today's MOOTW or SASO in 
an urban environment. As illustrated by U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) actions in 
Bosnia, UW skills provide invaluable tools to the commander for understanding, shaping, 
and engaging the urban area of operations (AO). On a more critical note, SF experiences 
in the Balkans reveal an alarming lack of doctrinal guidance for the missions they 
93
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accomplished. Although this is a credit to the flexibility, adaptability, and value of these 
unconventional warriors, it is an unnecessary handicap. Doctrinal updates are necessary 
now to provide the legitimacy for new training initiatives and experimentation. Because 
advisors, liaison elements, staff, and commanders rely on doctrine to guide their efforts, 
SF risk re-inventing the UW wheel for every contingency operation. Without an 
authoritative reference that delineates the parameters of UW in the urban environment, 
valuable assets may be underutilized or misutilized. 
C.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policymakers must find the political will to conduct UW during peacetime and 
conflict. The anachronistic image of U.S.-supported guerillas overthrowing a constituted 
regime to the horror of a global audience must be erased. UW in the urban arena 
provides decision-makers low-visibility options for obtaining either the support or 
neutrality of various elements of the society. It minimizes cost, and the potential for 
escalation to hostilities in close proximity to noncombatants, while matching the most 
suitable U.S. force to the most likely threats to be encountered during MOOTW or 
SASO. 
Current UW doctrine is sound, but not sufficient. Neither FM 31-20 Doctrine for 
Special Forces Operations (1990), nor the final draft of FM 3-05.20 Doctrine for Special 
Forces Operations (2000), include more than passing reference to conducting UW in an 
urban environment. The scope and complexity of this mission require more guidance. 
The contemporary likelihood that UW forces will share the battlespace with conventional 
and multinational forces during MOOTW demands rethinking the command and control 
relationships in the SF Unconventional Warfare Area of Operations (UWAO).   Early 
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forward engagement, and continuous employment - pre-conflict, during conflict, and 
post-conflict - are the keys to successfully building the rapport and relationships 
necessary to successfully conduct UW. If policymakers are serious about implementing 
UW options, the transition from peacetime engagement strategy to UW operational 
employment should be better defined. 
The debate over different definitions of UW is essentially one of degree. The 
current joint definition is entirely adequate; semantics should not detract from the need 
for definitive amplifying doctrine. This should be accomplished by providing detailed 
input to the upcoming publication of JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations, and the publication 
of (or next revision of) FM 3-05.20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. This is 
preferable to creating a mission subset for urban operations, or urban UW, which would 
further compartmentalize and isolate this knowledge. It is critical that a mission with the 
scope of UW be fully integrated into the operational concepts established by joint 
doctrine. By ensuring integration, a larger audience will be reached. 
Lastly, if military leaders are successful in addressing the complexities of JUO, 
and in laying the foundation for using UW in cities, improved UW training will ensure 
optimal results are achieved during future mission execution. SF operators exercise their 
UW skills during peacetime missions on a daily basis, but some skills go underutilized, 
and there is little outlet for comprehensive training exercises or institutional feedback. In 
the area of intelligence collection, Training in Low Level Source Operations (LLSO) and 
other Advanced Special Operations Techniques (ASOT) should be expanded to enhance 
the operational capabilities of SFODAs. Advanced education about urban infrastructure, 
and urban social networks, should be made available to UW operators.    At the 
68 
institutional level, the SF Qualification Course capstone UW exercise, Robin Sage, could 
easily be modified to provide an initial immersion in the urban environment. If resources 
permit, the exercise could be expanded to incorporate periodic rotations by SFODAs for 
comprehensive urban UW refresher training. This venue could provide an opportunity 
for evaluation, or institutional feedback on performance. 
With regard to the U.S. military's approach to urban operations during peace and 
conflict, the current state of affairs is unacceptable. Much of our best urban doctrine is 
based on analysis of battles that occurred two or more decades ago. For the most part, 
our tactics, techniques, and procedures for approaching urban operations were derived 
from World War II operational experience, and have changed little since then. The 
existence of doctrinal guidance for urban operations during MOOTW or SASO is 
virtually non-existent. More lessons need to be drawn from a full range of historical 
experiences other than the standard references to Stalingrad, Hue, and more recently, 
Mogadishu and Grozny. A wealth of potential knowledge exists in the collective 
experiences of the British in Cyprus, the French in Algiers, and the Israelis in Jerusalem. 
Unconventional Warfare provides an alternative, though not new, approach to the 
anachronistic "superior firepower" paradigm that inevitably entails the large-scale 
commitment of conventional soldiers to urban areas. 
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APPENDIX A 
Doctrine provides, "fundamental principles by which the military forces or 
elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives."94 A literature 
review of this doctrine reveals how forces organize, plan, and conduct operations. This 
information can then be used to identify what force capabilities might be assets, given the 
characteristics of urban operations. My review is focused on urban operations doctrine, 
and doctrinal references of significant importance to contemporary operations in urban 
areas. 
In 1994, a Defense Science Board report concluded that America's ability to 
conduct military operations in built-up areas was inadequate.95 While response to this 
overdue insight has been painstakingly slow, certain concerned policy-makers and senior 
decision-makers in the U.S. military have implemented several initiatives over the past 
decade to address this shortcoming. National-level interest resulted in creation of the J8 
Urban Working Group, and intense simulation and experimentation efforts on the part of 
the United States Marine Corps' Urban Warrior program. Efforts to update doctrine 
should shortly result in the Army's first revision of Field Manual (FM) 90-10 Military 
Operations on Urban Terrain since 1979. Perhaps more anticipated is JP 3-06 Joint 
Urban Operations, still in draft form. The experimentation efforts of the Urban Warrior 
program continue to yield invaluable lessons in tactics, techniques, and procedures, and 
contributed  to  publication  of a benchmark manual,  Marine  Corps  War fighting 
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Publication (MCWP) 3-35.5 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain. Several 
monographs published by RAND have identified this USMC manual as the best U.S. 
doctrine available for the urban environment, even recommending adopting the 
publication as interim joint doctrine for U.S. forces until a more comprehensive product 
becomes available.96 
The unfortunate reality is that today's body of doctrine for urban operations is 
inadequate in three respects: it is not current, relying on historical examples such as 
Stalingrad, Berlin, and Beirut to guide soldiers through the complexities of the modern 
urban battlefield; it focuses predominantly on high-intensity combat operations, ignoring 
the political and cultural realities of contemporary operations; and it persists in following 
a terrain-based approach, resulting in doctrine that does not address the city's integrated 
"system of systems." 
MCWP 3-35.3 ~ our most comprehensive urban doctrine - is partially based on 
historical cases that occurred seventeen or more years in the past, and could not possibly 
address recent changes in U.S. strategy adequately.97  For today's operations other than 
(MOBA). (November 1994) 1. 
96
 See Russell W. Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the 
Impending Urban Operations Threat RAND, MR-1007-A, Santa Monica, 1998, for this recommendation. 
Other RAND studies have previously identified MCWP 3-35.3 as the best U.S. doctrine available, citing 
Army publications as too hopelessly out of date (1979, for instance) to be relevant to today's strategic 
environment. They include: Russell W. Glenn, Combat in Hell: A Consideration of Constrained Urban 
Warfare, RAND, MR-780-A, Santa Monica, 1996; Russell W. Glenn, ...We Band of Brothers: The Call 
for Joint Urban Operations Doctrine. RAND, Santa Monica, 1999; and, Russell W. Glenn, Randall Steeb, 
et
- 
al> Denying the Widow-Maker: Summary of Proceedings. RAND-DBBL Conference on MOUT! 
RAND, DB-270-JS/A, Santa Monica, 1998. 
97
 In Chapter 1, MCWP 3-35.3 cites R. D. McLaurin, et. al., Modem Experience in Citv Combat. 
(Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland: U.S. Army Engineering Laboratory, 1987), as its source for 
illustrating the trends, dominant factors, and principles of combat in urbanized areas discussed in the 
manual. 
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war, heightened political sensitivity to American casualties, increased concern for the 
welfare of non-combatants, and new technological capabilities has made traditional 
measures of military success obsolete. The influential study that provides the foundation 
for the USMC manual's historical examples, Modern Experience in City Combat, 
identifies 22 MOUT battles that occurred between 1942 and 1982.98 Of these examples, 
only five include constraints or limitations on the forces involved that would classify the 
conflict as limited in nature: Jerusalem, Beirut I, Tel Zaatar, Ashrafiyeh, and Zahle. All 
of these battles occurred nineteen or more years ago, and all included predominantly 
high-intensity combat. Arguably, since the groups in conflict in these five battles were 
no longer willing to resolve their grievances primarily through political means, none fall 
within the realm U.S. doctrine identifies as "conflict."99 
La contrast to this sampling, consider the fact that the United States participated in 
only two deployments for peace, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief between 1945 
and 1989: the Dominican Republic, and Egypt. Since 1989, America has participated in 
at least six such operations: Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Bosnia, and the Sinai. As 
noted, for many reasons these operations frequently take place in cities and towns, often 
to a very large extent.100   Despite this, MCWP 3-35.3 provides little guidance for 
98
 These battles are identified as: Stalingrad, Ortona, Aachen, Arnem, Cherbourg, Berlin, Manila, 
Seoul, Jerusalem, Hue, Quang Tri I, Quang Tri II, Suez City, Ban Me Thout, Beirut I, Tel Zaatar, 
Ashrafiyeh, Khorramshahr, Zahle, Beirut II, Sidon, and Tyre. 
99
 FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations defines conflict as, "a range of political conditions that 
are neither peace nor war. Conflict is characterized by the introduction of organized violence into the 
political process; yet groups in conflict remain willing to resolve their problems primarily by political 
means, with limited military support. The lower range of conflict is peaceful, punctuated by occasional 
acts of political violence. At the upper levels, conflict is very close to war, except for its combination of 
political and military means." 
1°° A recent RAND study also queried whether this statistic pointed to a trend in future warfare, noting 
that, "lessons from urban operations that predate the early 1980s may be irrelevant or less important today." 
See Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations. RAND, MR-1173-A, 
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conducting operations under the strict rules of engagement (ROE) that were hallmarks of 
these missions. Although it was written from the perspective of a Marine air-ground task 
force, little attention is devoted to operational aspects of MOUT, and there is no coverage 
of operations other than combat. These non-combat operations are precisely those most 
frequently conducted by American forces in the last ten years. 
In fairness to MCWP 3-35.3, the manual's coverage of urban operations is far 
superior to current Army doctrine. As of this writing, the Army's FM 90-10 was last 
revised in 1979. The manual makes no connection between tactical and operational or 
strategic considerations, virtually ignores the consequences of the presence of 
noncombatants, and fails to consider the many implications and limitations of strict ROE. 
Presenting motorized rifle formations of the former Soviet Union as the likely MOUT 
opponent, FM 90-10 overemphasizes European terrain considerations. No mention is 
made of the irregular forces and Third World shantytowns encountered by American 
military personnel in operations in Panama, Haiti, or Mogadishu. 
The 1993 FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas, is 
published by the Army's Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. This manual is meant 
to serve as a more detailed guide for the individual infantryman on urban tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. In fact, it is superior in many respects to its parent manual, 
FM 90-10. Combined arms operations are discussed in detail, the concept of constrained 
operations in an urban environment is introduced, and a differentiation is made between 
"precision MOUT" and "surgical MOUT" to reflect operations conducted under stringent 
Santa Monica, 2000, p. 1-4. 
74 
ROE. Unfortunately, FM 90-10-1 does not sufficiently discuss the impact of 
noncombatants on military operations. The manual succeeds in its design as a good 
guide for the individual infantryman's techniques, but it does not provide the 
comprehensive MOUT doctrine needed for military operations today. The 
preponderance of its content deals with tactics, techniques, and procedures of the small- 
unit battle, devoting limited attention to operational-level aspects. The strategic 
component to MOUT is virtually ignored. This is particularly disturbing, given that 
tactical, operational, and strategic implications converge and reinforce each other as 
much as they do in the urban environment, as U.S. involvement in Hue and Mogadishu 
proved.101 
The current joint doctrine library is similarly inadequate. The 1993 JP 3.0 
Doctrine for Joint Operations makes no mention of urban operations. JP 3-10.1 Joint 
Tactics. Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense also accomplishes little more than 
recognizing that urban areas present unique difficulties for military forces.102 Nowhere 
do joint publications consider multinational urban operations, although coalition and 
allied operations are a reality on today's global stage.    Finally, although effective 
101
 During the 1968 Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War, U.S. forces were initially overrun in the 
city of Hue. While the offensive overall resulted in a devastating tactical defeat for the North Vietnamese, 
Americans were able to view the desperate combat in Hue live, on television. American astonishment over 
the resilience of an enemy the American government had pronounced nearly defeated caused a lack of 
confidence in U.S. political leadership, and is credited with significantly hastening U.S. troop withdrawal 
from Vietnam. On the night of October 3, 1993, Special Operations Task Force Ranger suffered 18 
Americans killed and 84 wounded in action with Somali militia - the worst U.S. firefight since the Vietnam 
War. As a direct result of this tactical action, political handling of the situation, and pressure by the 
disenfranchised U.S. public, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Operation 
Restore Hope, and Somalia, on November 19, 1993. See Rick Atkinson, "Night of a Thousand Casualties; 
Battle Triggered U.S. Decision to Withdraw from Somalia," Washington Post. January 31,1994, p. Al 1. 
102 Only cursory mention of the urban environment is made in the following Joint Publications: JP 3- 
07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. JP 3-08 Interagencv Coordination During Joint 
Operations. JP 3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support in 
Joint Operations, and JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support. 
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intelligence is considered imperative to success in modern urban operations, JP 2-0 
Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations makes no mention of the many 
considerations unique to intelligence preparation of urban battlespace.103 These 
shortcomings in doctrine are certain to lead to inadequacies in the composition and 
organization of forces deployed in the future. 
10^> 2
 Literature mentioning the uniquely critical role of intelligence to success in urban operations 
includes: MCWP 3-35.5 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, p. 1-12; LTC T. R. Milton, Jr., "Urban 
Operations: Future War," Military Review. Vol. 74, No. 2, February 1994, pp. 37-46; Scott Gerwehr and 
Russell W. Glenn, The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations. RAND, MR-1132-A, Santa 
Monica, 2000, pp. 37, 54; and Russell W. Glenn, ...We Band of Brothers: The Call for Joint'Urban 
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